(async () => {
  const results = new Set();

  // fokus ke endpoint penting aja
  const regex = /\/(api|v1|v2|v3|v4|public_api)\/[a-zA-Z0-9_\/\-?=&%.]+/g;

  const scripts = [...document.scripts]
    .map(s => s.src)
    .filter(Boolean);

Konsep: Prompt ini dirancang sebagai siklus tanpa akhir.
Jalankan Phase 1 → 2 → 3 → 4, lalu ulangi dari Phase 1 lagi.
Setiap putaran, project makin tajam mengikuti teknik terbaru dunia bug bounty.

LOOP:
  Phase 1 (Intel)       → Ambil teknik bypass terbaru dari dunia nyata
  Phase 2 (Gap)         → Bandingkan dengan arsenal CrewAgent sekarang

Project: Pentest Crew — Multi-agent offensive security pipeline
Stack: Python 3.10+, CrewAI, Burp Suite MCP, 30+ attack tool modules
Philosophy: Find the vuln. Prove it. Chain it. Report it.

Project: Pentest Crew — Multi-agent web application penetration testing pipeline
Stack: Python 3.10+, CrewAI, Burp Suite MCP, 30+ security tool modules
Modes: Single-agent (1 LLM key) or Multi-agent (2–8 LLM keys, 8 specialist agents)

Agent execution. One agent handles all four stages sequentially. Style: Evidence-based bug hunting — no assumptions, no fabrication, no theoretical findings.

The M-Pesa OpenAPI Portal was assessed via analysis of 38 HTTP transactions captured in the Burp Suite proxy history. The application demonstrates adequate baseline security controls, including HTTPS enforcement via HSTS, X-Frame-Options: DENY, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and a positive login flow incorporating MFA. However, the assessment identified five medium- and low-severity findings centered on information disclosure, insecure token handling, and missing security flags.

The most significant risk is the exposure of Bearer authentication tokens and sensitive user data (email addresses, test MSISDNs) within the Burp proxy history, which could be leveraged by an attacker with access to the same proxy or browser history. Additionally, the email confirmation token was transmitted as a URL parameter, risking exposure via browser history, referrer headers, and server-side logging.

Risk Rating Summary:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  AGENT 1 – ANALYST (Gemini)                                                 │
│  get_proxy_http_history · get_proxy_http_history_regex                      │
│  get_proxy_websocket_history · get_scanner_issues · output_project_options  │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤

Here’s a practical way to wire Codex CLI to Burp Suite through an MCP server so Codex can inspect Burp HTTP history and help identify likely vulnerabilities.

The safest setup is:

Burp Suite MCP extension → packaged stdio proxy → Codex CLI

That path matters because Codex CLI supports STDIO MCP servers and Streamable HTTP MCP servers, while PortSwigger’s Burp extension explicitly ships with a stdio proxy for MCP clients and documents it as the manual integration route. ([OpenAI Developers][1])

Bet. You got an old Samsung A51 lying around? Or maybe you just wanna flex a wireless mic setup without dropping bags on a Blue Yeti? Say less. This guide is for the Arch Linux gang who wanna use their phone as a mic AND keep their TWS earbuds connected via bluetoothctl. No cap, this setup is lowkey goated.