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| ⏺ You're right — I was stuck in the wrong substrate model. Let me course-correct. | |
| ★ Insight ───────────────────────────────────── | |
| - I was treating "state tree" as the private-data substrate and "EVM contract storage" as the public-data substrate, as if Sub-project A's | |
| fabric didn't apply here. It does apply. The state tree is a content-addressed key-value store with on-chain root commitments — it has nothing | |
| inherently private about it. Encrypted leaves = private data (Sub-project A's SecretsRegistry); plaintext leaves = public data (Sub-project B's | |
| artifacts). The substrate is the same, only leaf encryption differs. | |
| - On-chain, we only ever need the hash + root commitments. For a specific task, NewtonPolicy.policyCodeHash already commits to the Rego bytes — | |
| any fetcher verifies keccak256(bytes) == policyCodeHash and that closes the integrity loop regardless of where bytes live. For registry-level | |
| questions ("is this plugin still approved?"), the 120s BLS-signed state root + inclusion proof |
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| ⏺ You're right — I was stuck in the wrong substrate model. Let me course-correct. | |
| ★ Insight ───────────────────────────────────── | |
| - I was treating "state tree" as the private-data substrate and "EVM contract storage" as the public-data substrate, as if Sub-project A's | |
| fabric didn't apply here. It does apply. The state tree is a content-addressed key-value store with on-chain root commitments — it has nothing | |
| inherently private about it. Encrypted leaves = private data (Sub-project A's SecretsRegistry); plaintext leaves = public data (Sub-project B's | |
| artifacts). The substrate is the same, only leaf encryption differs. | |
| - On-chain, we only ever need the hash + root commitments. For a specific task, NewtonPolicy.policyCodeHash already commits to the Rego bytes — | |
| any fetcher verifies keccak256(bytes) == policyCodeHash and that closes the integrity loop regardless of where bytes live. For registry-level | |
| questions ("is this plugin still approved?"), the 120s BLS-signed state root + inclusion proof |
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| ❯ Refer to @docs/STREAMING_CONSENSUS.md , that contains our architectural improvement design for improving the performance / latency / | |
| efficiency of the protocol. recall from previous memory about our discussion, analysis, trade offs, decision choices and rationales. We | |
| will go back to this architectural design and critically re-evaluate the architecture and design decisions from the first principle, | |
| evaluating against other approaches in terms of performance, latency, reliability, scalability, throughput, security, fault tolerance, | |
| and (least prioritized) decentralization | |
| ⎿ Read docs/STREAMING_CONSENSUS.md (1772 lines) | |
| ⎿ Loaded docs/CLAUDE.md | |
| ⏺ I'll invoke the brainstorming skill to properly evaluate this design against alternatives from first principles. |
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| The goal of prevent developers in the team accidentally forget to make sure the Rust code to be compatible to both old vs new | |
| contract versions. There are 3 scenarios: 1) contracts upgraded first with breaking change before Rust update 2) contracts with | |
| breaking change not upgraded yet, but Rust deploys, 3) contracts upgraded and Rust update also deployed, but for Newton | |
| Policy/Newton Policy Data/and Policy Clients (that extends NewtonPolicyClient mixin), there is a grace period for the developers | |
| to migrate/update their policy clients with new newton policy or policy data. This means the Rust update that pairs with the | |
| contracts upgrade with breaking change should support both versions during this grace period (until version enforcement happens). | |
| 1, 2 are for prevent protocol literally failing, while 3 is for external developer's policy clients to start failing suddenly | |
| without having time to become compatible. /clarify-plan THINK HARD | |
| ⏺ I'll work through this as a design problem. The three s |
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| ⏺ Review posted: https://github.com/newt-foundation/newton-prover-avs/pull/541#pullrequestreview-4116329428 | |
| Three inline comments, state CHANGES_REQUESTED: | |
| 1. Gap 1 (blocker) on ChallengeVerifier.sol:156 — Critical 4 is only half-fixed. The hash-encoding mismatch is resolved, but the | |
| proof-to-canonical-code binding (sub-issue 5b in Octane's report) remains open. raiseAndResolveChallenge and | |
| slashForCrossChainChallenge bind to policy.getEntrypoint() but never to policyCid or equivalent code digest — a malicious challenger | |
| can craft a proof evaluating different Rego code sharing the same entrypoint and slash honest operators. | |
| 2. Gap 6 (high) on ChallengeVerifier.sol:513 — after the try/catch in challengeDirectlyVerifiedMismatch, the slashing path decodes | |
| NonSignerStakesAndSignature from untrusted signatureData. Unlike raiseAndResolveChallenge, there's no validateSignatoryRecord bind — a |
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| how do I publish newton-cli? | |
| Searched for 2 patterns, read 1 file, listed 1 directory (ctrl+o to expand) | |
| ⏺ Here's the honest answer: there is currently no path to publish newton-cli — and it's blocked by three distinct issues, some of which | |
| are hard blockers. | |
| Blockers | |
| 1. License is not accepted by crates.io (hard blocker) |
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| --- | |
| Gateway Scalability & Throughput Analysis | |
| End-to-End Flow Timeline | |
| Here's the create_task critical path with approximate timings: | |
| Client Request | |
| │ | |
| ├── Phase 0: Request Setup ..................... ~1-5ms |
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| --- | |
| Meeting: TEE Integration for Newton Protocol | |
| --- | |
| Problem Statement | |
| Newton Protocol accumulates sensitive data (identity PII, confidential data, policy client secrets) that operators must decrypt and | |
| process during policy evaluation. Two core concerns: | |
| 1. Operator data leakage — operators currently decrypt private data locally, meaning a malicious or compromised operator could exfiltrate |
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| one question: does the contract revert only detectable from transaction receipt? or can it be detected from just sendTransaction? | |
| currently, the problem with batch tx submission is that it is a single loop, sequential process with retry. Instead, let's explore | |
| pipelining architecture where the initial submission of the batch doesn't block, and the failures are handled on a separate queue | |
| (will we need a failed tx handling dedicated task generator signer key that is separate from the main submission signer key?) | |
| /clarify-plan | |
| ⏺ Skill(/clarify-plan) | |
| ⎿ Successfully loaded skill | |
| ⏺ Good questions. Let me first answer your initial question, then clarify the design space. |
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| Here's the full picture: | |
| --- | |
| Newton Privacy Layer — Known Limitations & Next Steps | |
| ★ Insight ───────────────────────────────────── | |
| The limitations fall into three buckets: (1) security gaps where the system doesn't enforce what it should, (2) trust assumptions | |
| where centralization remains, and (3) missing infrastructure that blocks future phases. Each has a clear resolution path — none are | |
| architectural dead ends. | |
| ───────────────────────────────────────────────── |
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