Context: This supplements Ben Polonsky's writeup with net-new findings from active infrastructure reconnaissance conducted 2026-03-28. All probing was passive/non-invasive against already-identified phishing infrastructure.
The article identified OpenResty 1.29.2.1 as the web server. Behind it sits a second layer:
SERVLET: io.javalin.jetty.JavalinJettyServlet-5bf7f15f
Full stack: Cloudflare (free tier) → OpenResty 1.29.2.1 → Javalin (Java/Kotlin) on Eclipse Jetty
Discovered via WebSocket upgrade request to ilsos.orekx.life, which triggered Jetty's default error page:
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1"/>
<title>Error 404 WebSocket handler not found</title>
<tr><th>SERVLET:</th><td>io.javalin.jetty.JavalinJettyServlet-5bf7f15f</td></tr>Corroborated by 8K path overflow returning Jetty's signature 431 Bad Message format.
Not in the original article. The phishing backend exposes an auth-gated operator panel:
| Endpoint | Status | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
GET /console/ |
401 | Operator panel root — requires authentication |
GET /console (no slash) |
400 | Route exists, trailing slash required |
/console/* (all sub-paths) |
400 | Routes registered but auth-gated |
/console/ws (WebSocket) |
400 | Real-time C2 WebSocket endpoint |
Confirmed sub-routes (all return 400, indicating registered handlers behind auth):
/console/login /console/auth /console/api
/console/admin /console/dashboard /console/operator
/console/operators /console/config /console/settings
/console/victims /console/sessions /console/campaigns
/console/templates /console/logs /console/data
/console/export /console/import /console/status
/console/health /console/ws /console/websocket
/console/static/ /console/assets/ /console/js/
/console/css/ /console/favicon.ico
Auth mechanism is not Basic, Bearer, API-key, or simple cookie. Enforced at Javalin middleware level before route dispatch. Classic Jetty semicolon/traversal bypasses all fail.
| Domain | DNS | HTTP | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
xykri.com |
clientHold (suspended) | Dead | Registrar Cloud Yuqu LLC finally acted |
oe.xykri.com |
No resolution | Dead | — |
orekx.life |
NS only (no A) | — | Cloudflare NS: kevin/keira |
ilsos.orekx.life |
172.67.200.47 / 104.21.76.199 | LIVE | API framework responding; /console/ returns 401 |
hxlkm.life |
172.67.218.70 / 104.21.45.190 | Parked | Rerouted to Skenzo/ParkingCrew |
ilsos.hxlkm.life |
Same as parent | Down | Resolves but no HTTP response |
ilsos.orekx.life is the critical finding — the Javalin backend is still running. Phishing victim routes (/pay/b_info.html, /pay/c_info.html, /api/verify/{code}) return 404 (deregistered), but the operator panel at /console/ is live and auth-gated. This infrastructure can be re-weaponized with fresh routes at any time.
Separate Cloudflare accounts per domain (compartmentalized OPSEC):
| Domain | CF Nameservers | CF Flight ID |
|---|---|---|
| xykri.com | ivan / kinsley | — |
| orekx.life | kevin / keira | 447f109 |
| hxlkm.life | pola / kellen | 12f952 |
Cloudflare Trace (/cdn-cgi/trace):
- Datacenter: LAX (Los Angeles)
- TLS: TLSv1.3 with X25519Kyber768Draft00 (post-quantum key exchange)
- WARP/Gateway/RBI: all off
- Free tier only — no WAF rules, no Workers, no Pages, no Tunnel
Origin IP: Not leaked. Unflare origin discovery, subdomain brute (35 subs), DNS history, mail records, and direct-IP-with-Host-header all failed to reveal the origin. Likely Tencent or Alibaba Cloud based on ecosystem patterns.
hxlkm.life root domain leaked critical headers:
Via: 0.0 Caddy
X-Redirect: skenzo
X-Pcrew-Blocked-Reason: (empty)
X-Pcrew-Ip-Organization: Spectrum
X-Domain: hxlkm.life
Accept-Ch: viewport-width, dpr, device-memory, rtt, downlink, ect,
ua, ua-full-version, ua-platform, ua-platform-version,
ua-arch, ua-model, ua-mobile
Root is served via Skenzo (domain monetization, BVI) / ParkingCrew (Team Internet AG, Munich) through a Caddy reverse proxy. But wildcard DNS still active — all subdomains (*.hxlkm.life) route to Cloudflare → nginx origin returning 403.
Registrar: Cloud Yuqu LLC (IANA 3824)
Registrar URL: diymysite.com
WHOIS Server: whois.diymysite.com
Registrant: Jiangxi Province (江西省), China
Created: 2025-04-15
Status: clientHold (suspended as of 2026-03-21)
Abuse Email: abuse@diymysite.com / demi@diymysite.com
Abuse Phone: +86.17723349228 / +86.19981778832
Registrar: Dynadot Inc (IANA 472)
Registered: 2026-03-19T10:51:57Z
Last Changed: 2026-03-24T10:52:29Z
Abuse: abuse@dynadot.com / +1.6502620100
Status: client transfer prohibited
Registrar: Dynadot Inc (IANA 472)
Registered: 2026-03-20T10:56:51Z ← ONE DAY after orekx.life
Last Changed: 2026-03-25T10:57:27Z
Abuse: abuse@dynadot.com / +1.6502620100
Status: client transfer prohibited
Pre-staging confirmed: hxlkm.life was registered exactly one day after orekx.life as a ready-to-go fallback domain.
| Subject | Issuer | Issued | SAN | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
orekx.life |
Let's Encrypt E7 | 2026-03-19 | *.orekx.life, orekx.life |
Wildcard, same day as registration |
hxlkm.life |
Let's Encrypt E7 | 2026-03-20 | *.hxlkm.life, hxlkm.life |
Wildcard, same day as registration |
oe.xykri.com |
Let's Encrypt R13 | 2026-03-19 | Single | Specific subdomain cert |
xykri.com |
Sectigo DV E36 | 2026-03-15 | *.xykri.com, xykri.com |
Wildcard, paid Sectigo via CF |
Wildcard certs on all domains enable rapid subdomain rotation without new issuance.
The article references "Crimson Vector" and "Lighthouse Smishing Syndicate 2026". These names do not appear in public threat intelligence. The operation maps to the Smishing Triad ecosystem, tracked under these names:
| Vendor | Tracking Name |
|---|---|
| Google TAG | Lighthouse PhaaS (lawsuit filed Nov 2025, SDNY) |
| Prodaft | LARVA-241 (Wang Duo Yu / Lighthouse developer) |
| Silent Push | Smishing Triad |
| Unit 42 | Global Smishing Campaign |
| Resecurity | Smishing Triad |
| Netcraft | Lighthouse / Lucid PhaaS |
Key details:
- 194,000+ malicious domains, 8,800+ IPs, 200+ ASNs
- $1B+ estimated revenue over three years
- 1M+ confirmed victims across 120+ countries
- Key developer Wang Duo Yu (老王) named in Google's civil action
.lifeis a confirmed TLD in the Smishing Triad rotation- Cloud Yuqu LLC is a known registrar in this ecosystem
- Post-Lighthouse disruption (Nov 2025), operators migrated between Darcula and Lucid PhaaS platforms
xykri.com # QR redirect (SUSPENDED - clientHold)
oe.xykri.com # Landing page (DOWN)
orekx.life # Phishing host
ilsos.orekx.life # Fake IL SoS portal (LIVE - C2 panel active)
hxlkm.life # Replacement host (PARKED via Skenzo)
ilsos.hxlkm.life # Replacement portal (DOWN)
172.67.200.47 # ilsos.orekx.life
104.21.76.199 # ilsos.orekx.life
172.67.218.70 # hxlkm.life
104.21.45.190 # hxlkm.life
2606:4700:3030::ac43:c82f # ilsos.orekx.life (IPv6)
2606:4700:3033::6815:4cc7 # ilsos.orekx.life (IPv6)
2606:4700:3030::6815:2dbe # hxlkm.life (IPv6)
2606:4700:3034::ac43:da46 # hxlkm.life (IPv6)
ivan.ns.cloudflare.com / kinsley.ns.cloudflare.com # xykri.com
kevin.ns.cloudflare.com / keira.ns.cloudflare.com # orekx.life
pola.ns.cloudflare.com / kellen.ns.cloudflare.com # hxlkm.life
Cloud Yuqu LLC (IANA 3824)
URL: diymysite.com
WHOIS: whois.diymysite.com
Abuse: abuse@diymysite.com / demi@diymysite.com
Phone: +86.17723349228 / +86.19981778832
Location: Hainan, China
CDN: Cloudflare (free tier, separate accounts per domain)
Frontend: OpenResty 1.29.2.1 (Nginx + Lua)
Backend: Javalin on Eclipse Jetty (io.javalin.jetty.JavalinJettyServlet-5bf7f15f)
Encryption: AES-256-CTR (key in cleartext with payload)
Template: US-IL-ticket-ilsos
C2 Panel: /console/ (auth-gated, 25+ operator routes)
POST /api/verify/{code} # Victim verification + redirect
POST /pay/api/open/getSyncSettings # Encrypted data exfiltration
POST /pay/api/open/pollInstruction # Real-time operator C2 polling
GET /pay/b_info.html # Billing info collection form
GET /pay/c_info.html # Credit card collection form
/console/ # Panel root (401 Unauthorized)
/console/login # Login endpoint
/console/auth # Auth endpoint
/console/api # Panel API
/console/victims # Victim data management
/console/sessions # Active sessions
/console/campaigns # Campaign management
/console/templates # Phishing template library
/console/operators # Operator accounts
/console/export # Data exfiltration/export
/console/ws # WebSocket C2 channel
A researcher published SQLi dumps, cracked credentials, and a password cracker from the earlier USPS variant of this same PhaaS operation. Key findings:
Password Hashing Algorithm (confirmed):
// From cracker.go — the kit uses triple-MD5 with a hardcoded salt
buf.WriteString(password + "wangduoyu666!.+-") // salt = developer's name + lucky numbers
hash := md5.Sum(buf.Bytes()) // MD5 round 1
hash = md5.Sum([]byte(hex(hash))) // MD5 round 2
hash = md5.Sum([]byte(hex(hash))) // MD5 round 3The salt wangduoyu666!.+- literally contains the Lighthouse developer's name — Wang Duo Yu (王多鱼). This is the same individual named in Google's November 2025 lawsuit. 50+ operator passwords were cracked from this scheme (e.g., 123456, 88888888, A123123, Aa123456).
Admin Table Schema (from SQLi dump):
id, token, desc, name, type, avatar, login_ip, password, username, login_time, permission
type=1= admin,type=2= operator,type=4= unknown role- Admin account links to Telegram:
https://t.me/wangduoyu0 - Operator login IPs:
222.77.240.43,2409:8a34:3c28:e01:...(Chinese IP space) - Usernames are encrypted (base64-like encoding), not plaintext
Config Table Schema (phishing kit configuration):
pid, tg_uid, otp, key, url, mount, state, title, captcha, ht_type,
tg_open, timeout, allow_pc, tg_token, pay_status, succ_count,
redirect_url, refresh_rate, refuse_cards, country_whitelist, ...
Key fields reveal:
- Telegram integration for real-time operator alerts (
tg_token,tg_uid,tg_open) - BIN filtering —
refuse_cardscontains 1000+ card BIN prefixes to reject (likely prepaid/virtual cards) - Country whitelisting for victim filtering
- OTP/CAPTCHA toggle for verification pages
allow_pcflag — confirms mobile-only rendering is configurablesucc_count— tracks successful card captures per campaign
| Query | Finding |
|---|---|
"此页面为真人身份验证" |
Zero results — this Chinese verification string is unique to this kit variant and not yet leaked publicly. High-confidence detection fingerprint. |
"US-IL-ticket-ilsos" |
Zero results — template ID not leaked |
diymysite.com |
Appears in SmokeDetector (spam detection), deCloudflare (149,603 NS entries), DECEPT-URL phishing research, and ICANN registrar databases |
"Cloud Yuqu" |
Listed in ICANN registrar IDs and DNS abuse contact databases |
If the toll phishing kit at ilsos.orekx.life uses the same password hashing scheme (wangduoyu666!.+- triple-MD5), then the 50+ cracked passwords from the USPS variant represent potential authentication material for the /console/ operator panel we discovered. The admin table schema also maps cleanly to the console routes we identified (/console/operators, /console/sessions, /console/campaigns).
- Cloudflare abuse report for
ilsos.orekx.life— the backend is live with an active operator panel. This is the highest-leverage takedown action available right now. - Dynadot abuse report for both
orekx.lifeandhxlkm.life— request full suspension, not just root parking. - IC3/FBI submission with the full IOC set and Smishing Triad attribution.
- Monitor Javalin/Jetty fingerprint — the servlet hash
5bf7f15fcould be used for Shodan/Censys pivoting to find other deployments of this same PhaaS kit if the origin IP is ever exposed.
Using the phishing kit's favicon hash and "Human Verification" page title as pivot fingerprints, URLScan.io reveals the Lighthouse kit is massively active across thousands of domains.
Pivot query: page.title:"Human Verification" AND page.server:cloudflare → 5,947 scans
Favicon hash pivot (e5da3e0862438e2046d7b2ba0b575f0639e03b6936f69d2c459616b8686d9439) → 147 unique deployments
| Domain | IP | URL Pattern | Last Seen |
|---|---|---|---|
tio.usamotortoys.com |
104.21.70.132 | /public/SNrbRt |
2026-03-29 |
edna.agdstudios.com |
2a06:98c1:3121::3 | /public/PTDP2W |
2026-03-28 |
evq.aprenderaleer.com |
188.114.97.3 | /public/zNORpK |
2026-03-27 |
ik.djjonathan.com |
172.67.152.128 | /public/bL8K4N |
2026-03-27 |
gt.aopinion.com |
172.67.206.218 | /public/taSr3a |
2026-03-26 |
ru.wbxvgzc.com |
188.114.96.3 | /public/nh9ven |
2026-03-26 |
ek.anoreksi.com |
188.114.97.3 | /public/ryTerg |
2026-03-26 |
qe.tuoitreyduoc.com |
172.67.140.33 | /public/ny |
2026-03-25 |
sn.iluminacionpreferente.com |
172.67.223.145 | /public/9T2omD |
2026-03-25 |
mh.sumsuc.com |
172.67.192.235 | /public/D8ICVX |
2026-03-25 |
cj.whdmql.com |
172.67.182.90 | /public/LQTmrJ |
2026-03-24 |
All share: Cloudflare edge, subdomain.domain pattern, /public/{6-char-code} URL path, "Human Verification" title.
| URL Path | Chinese | Target State |
|---|---|---|
/public/马萨2 |
马萨诸塞 | Massachusetts |
/public/田纳西2 |
田纳西 | Tennessee |
/public/z0gMz1 |
encoded | Unknown |
/public/IHqaQS |
encoded | Unknown |
/public/GNGW7d |
encoded | Unknown |
172.67.210.175 # oe.xykri.com (new)
104.21.69.173 # oe.xykri.com (new)
188.114.96.3 # Cloudflare (new)
188.114.97.3 # Cloudflare (new)
| Signature | Type | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
URLScan favicon hash e5da3e...9439 |
File hash | 147+ domains |
Page title "Human Verification" + CF + /public/ |
HTTP fingerprint | 5,947+ scans |
changleField typo in Socket.IO events |
Code fingerprint | ALL Lighthouse deployments |
io.javalin.jetty.JavalinJettyServlet in WS 404 |
Server fingerprint | Backend framework |
Contains admin.sql with the same superuser ID 9527 and TG:wangduoyu0 found in SQLi dumps. Also contains Telegram bot code, PHP/Node.js backend work, Chinese technical documentation, and cryptocurrency trading spreadsheets. May be from someone inside the Smishing Triad development ecosystem.
wangduoyu.me # Active IOC (Securonix, Infoblox feeds)
wangduoyu.shop # Active IOC
wangduoyu.site # Active IOC
wangduoyu.com # Expired
wangduoyu.net # Expired
wangduoyu.com.cn # Expired
| Repository | Content |
|---|---|
Securonix/AutonomousThreatSweeper |
SIEM hunting queries + wangduoyu IOC domains |
infobloxopen/threat-intelligence |
Official Infoblox IOC feeds for USPS smishing |
iocradar0-netizen/IOCs |
Dedicated Smishing Triad.txt IOC file |
nabeelxy/web-security-agents |
Unit 42 global smishing campaign report |
polarityio/google-threat-intelligence |
Smishing Triad in Google TI constants |
MISP/misp-website |
Smishing Triad added to MISP galaxy taxonomy |
mthcht/ThreatIntel-Reports |
Netcraft report: 17,500+ Lighthouse/Lucid domains |
137.184.82.92 # DigitalOcean
185.14.47.210 # European hosting
117.44.51.222 # China Telecom (Fujian)
120.37.249.242 # China Telecom (Fujian)
202.124.43.230 # Asian hosting
106.226.19.70 # China Mobile
45.145.74.134 # European VPS
27.153.244.196 # China Telecom (Fujian)
117.26.240.241 # China Telecom (Fujian)
162.251.63.49 # US hosting
147.185.242.202 # US hosting
120.37.228.20 # China Telecom (Fujian)
Pattern: Heavy concentration in Fujian Province, China (China Telecom) — a known cybercrime hub.
Reconnaissance conducted 2026-03-28/29 using dnsx, subfinder, naabu, nuclei, katana, Unflare, ffuf, URLScan.io, URLhaus, ThreatFox, AlienVault OTX, manual HTTP probing, and GitHub code/repo search. No exploitation attempted — all findings are from publicly observable responses, public APIs, and public repositories.